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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to analyse the relationship 
between the dynamics of labour force participation and informal care to the elderly for a sample 
of women aged 20-59 across 13 European countries. The analysis has two focal points: the 
relative contributions of state dependence as well as observed and unobserved heterogeneity in 
explaining the dynamics in women’s labour force participation and the existence and 
consequences of non-random attrition from the ECHP.  
The results indicate positive state dependence in labour force participation in all 13 EU 
countries used in the analysis. The share of unobserved heterogeneity accounts for between 45% 
and 86% of the total variation in labour force participation. Informal care-giving is found to 
have a significant, negative impact on the probability of employment only in Germany. 
Nevertheless, analysis of different sub-groups indicates that the impact is largest for middle-
aged women and also for single women in several EU countries. 
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Informal Elderly Care and Female Labour 
Force Participation across Europe 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 13/July 2005 
Tarja K. Viitanen* 
1. Introduction 
EU countries are faced with the challenges of an ageing population (Eurostat, 2000). Increasing 
participation in the labour market to maintain a sustainable dependency ratio lies at the heart of 
the European employment strategy. In particular, the Lisbon agenda has set an ambitious target 
for raising women’s employment rates to 60% across the EU. Yet many EU countries have 
women’s labour force participation (LFP) rates well below this target (see Table 3 in the main 
body of the report).
1 Furthermore, the progress towards the target rate has been faltering in 
recent years (European Council, 2004).  
Women are still responsible for the majority of informal care-giving within the household.
2 
Whereas the literature on the impact of childcare responsibilities on labour force participation is 
large, elderly care has received less attention. Nevertheless, informal elderly care is already a 
common phenomenon across EU countries (see Figure 1). Furthermore, improvements in the 
lifespan of the elderly mean that more resources need to be targeted at the elderly to help them, 
for example, to deal with everyday ADL or IADL restrictions.
3 A recent trend in EU countries 
however is to re-direct transfers from the public provision of elderly care to informal care 
(Jenson & Jacobzone, 2000). The financial costs of this can be substantial, especially if the 
caregivers are forced to interrupt their careers or retire early in order to facilitate the provision 
of informal elder-care at home.
4 
The increasing reliance on informal care-giving is in conflict with the European Commission 
target to increase women’s labour force participation rates. Figure 1 shows that the incidence of 
informal caring increases dramatically from age 40 onwards reaching 12% across the EU. At the 
same time, women’s labour force participation rates decrease considerably (see Figure 1 for 
overall EU levels or Table 3 for country specific rates). This paper examines whether informal 
caring constrains women in their labour market participation. Caring responsibilities may lead 
to the old-age poverty of carers if they reduce their employment as a consequence of caring, for 
example, owing to lower collected pension entitlements. Caring may also increase income 
inequality if disproportionate numbers of lower-income households provide informal care to 
their elderly relatives.  
 
                                                 
1 For background information on the trends and determinants of women’s labour supply in OECD 
countries, see Jaumotte (2003) or European Commission (2004). 
2 Possible motivation for informal care includes, for example, altruism or a bequest motive (Bernheim et 
al., 1985). 
3 ADLs are activities of daily living, which include tasks such as eating, bathing and dressing. IADLs are 
instrumental activities of daily living, which include tasks such as shopping, meal preparation, using the 
telephone and medication management. 
4 Women earn less, take more time off the labour force because of children and other care-giving and 
hence accrue a lower pension entitlement. They also outlive men on average as well as earn less than 
men. Further, the rising divorce rates may be a concern. 2 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
Figure 1. Informal elderly care and LFP by age 
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Notes: Incidence rates across the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. The line represents 
for labour force participation and the bars are informal elderly care. 
This paper examines the impact of caring on the employment dynamics of women aged 20-59 
across the EU. Estimates are provided for the potential negative employment effects of care 
responsibilities,
5 but also for the degree of state dependence in women’s labour force 
participation across the 13 EU countries. Compared with the previous EU-wide study on 
informal care-giving and women’s labour force participation by Spiess & Schneider (2002, 
2003), this study provides comprehensive country-specific estimates using both a static and a 
dynamic framework of analysis, including a thorough analysis of the impact of informal elderly 
care on labour force participation by age cohort and marital status. 
Previous literature on the allocation of time between the provision of informal care to the 
elderly and labour market work is sparse and mostly analysed in the US context. The earliest 
studies by Wolf & Soldo (1994) and Stern (1995) provide no evidence that parental care reduces 
the propensity to be employed or to reduce the conditional hours of work. This result is not 
confirmed in most other studies. Caring for parents living outside the household and 
intergenerational co-residence is more commonly found to have a large negative impact on the 
labour supply of both men and women (Ettner, 1996; Johnson & Lo Sasso, 2000).  
Furthermore, Johnson & Lo Sasso (2000) conclude that formal care purchased in the 
marketplace is not an attractive substitute for informal care. Similarly, intergenerational co-
residence is found to be an important mode of assistance to elderly persons (in the US) and that 
public care might substitute rather than complement family care at no direct cost to the   
 
                                                 
5 Obviously the employment effect of caring can be positive if the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect; however, previous studies have exclusively found a null or negative impact of care-
giving on employment.  INFORMAL ELDERLY CARE AND FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION ACROSS EUROPE | 3 
government (Pezzin et al., 1996; Pezzin & Schone, 1999). The likelihood for intergenerational 
co-residence increases with parental housing wealth but decreases with the care-giving burden 
(Hoerger et al., 1996). 
UK evidence on the impact of informal care on labour force participation includes studies by 
Carmichael & Charles (2003) and Heitmueller (2004). The former UK study finds that high-
intensity carers are somewhat less likely to work. Heitmueller (2004) finds a significant impact 
of caring on labour force participation only on co-residential carers, hence confirming that the 
choice of intergenerational co-residence is an important mode of assistance to elderly persons in 
the UK. Spiess & Schneider (2002, 2003) use two years of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) for 12 countries and find a significant negative association between starting and 
increasing informal care-giving and the change in weekly work hours. They find that the impact 
varies across countries with northern European women responding to starting care 
responsibilities and southern European women responding to increasing them. Nevertheless, 
their analysis does not allow for country-specific effects or for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity and state dependence. In addition, their pooling of countries into northern and 
southern European countries does not allow us to draw policy conclusions for any country 
separately. Overall, the previous analyses using the ECHP to examine this topic do not fully 
exploit the panel nature of the data and rely on strict assumptions regarding the unobservables 
both at the individual and at the country level. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric method used in the 
analysis. Section 3 presents the data with a description of its main features. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the results of the estimation and section 5 concludes.   
2. Econometric  method 
This paper estimates the impact of informal caring on women’s labour force participation using 
both static and dynamic panel data estimation. Only the extensive (participation) margin is 
examined owing to the previously quoted EU targets of 60% for women’s labour force 
participation. Furthermore, Heckman (1993) notes that the labour supply response of women is 
strongest at the participation margin. 
The dynamic structure of modelling labour force participation allows us to distinguish between 
the unobserved individual effect and past participation by the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the model. The importance of distinguishing between the unobserved heterogeneity 
and true state dependence is directly relevant to the EU employment targets. For example, if 
there is no state dependence in women’s labour force participation then informal caring 
responsibilities would potentially have a large negative impact on the employment probabilities.  
Heckman (1981) separates serial persistence in labour force participation decisions into true 
state dependence and spurious state dependence. True state dependence results from the 
changed propensity to participate in the labour market as a result of past participation. Spurious 
state dependence is the result of persistent individual heterogeneity that causes participation 
propensities to differ irrespective of past participation. Hence neglecting heterogeneity in 
dynamic models overstates the effect of past participation on current participation.  
The reasons quoted for the positive state dependence in labour force participation include, for 
example, human capital and job-matching models as well as intertemporally non-separable 
preferences for leisure (Hotz et al., 1988) or high fixed costs (for example, search costs) of 
entering the labour market (Eckstein & Wolpin, 1990). 
To distinguish between true state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic random 
effects probit models and a pooled estimator for 13 EU countries are estimated (see, for 4 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
example, Wooldridge, 2002). The probit model, where yit indicates a dichotomous variable 
taking value one for those who are observed working at time t and yit-1 indicating its lagged 
value, can be formalised as follows: 
  ( ) 0 1 2 1 1 > + + + = − it i it it it e c z y y θ θ  (1) 
where 1(.) is an indicator function that equals unity if the condition in the parentheses is true and 
zero otherwise, zit is a vector of exogenous variables, including a dichotomous variable for 
elderly care, and ci and eit are unobservables. The individual-specific term ci accounts for the 
time-invariant, unobservable determinants of labour force participation for a given individual 
reflecting, for example, the latent propensity to work or motivation. The residuals eit are 
assumed N(0,1).  
Given the presence of individual-specific effects ci in a dynamic binary choice model, one 
cannot validly assume that the initial observation on labour force participation, y0, is truly 
exogenous since the start of the stochastic process is not observed. This is known as the initial 
conditions problem (Heckman, 1981); in other words, those who are observed working at t0 
may not be a random sample. Initial conditions in this paper are specified as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2000, 2005).
6 
  i i i i a z y c + + + = 2 0 1 0 α α α  (2) 
The Wooldridge solution to the initial conditions problem conditions the distribution of the 
unobserved effect on the initial value of the dependent variable and any exogenous explanatory 
variables. The inclusion of the means of the time-varying regressors zi allows the observed 
regressors to be correlated with the individual effect (Mundlak, 1978, Chamberlain, 1984). The 
αi are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance σa
2. Furthermore, eit are 
assumed to be independent of ci. In other words, their intertemporal correlation is constant 
across time given by  2 2
2
e a
a
σ σ
σ
ρ
+
= . Using these assumptions, the individual effect can be 
integrated out and approximated by Gauss-Hermite quadrature for the random effects probit 
model (Butler & Moffitt, 1982).  
A further crucial assumption of the random effects probit is the following: 
  ) , , | 1 ( ) , , ,..., | 1 ( 1 0 1 i it it it i i i it it c z y y P c z y y y P − − = = =  (3) 
In other words, zit are assumed strictly exogenous once they are conditioned on the initial 
conditions. This assumption can be examined by testing whether there are any feedback effects 
from the future values of the explanatory variables to the current value of the dependent 
variable. In the presence of feedback effects, the random effects probit estimates are biased.  
In the presence of feedback effects the pooled estimator provides consistent but inefficient 
estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). A slight disadvantage of pooled estimation is that the share of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the error variance (ρ) cannot be determined. In the pooled model 
the variance of the total error term is normalised to one (whereas in the random effects probit 
the overall error variance equals σa
2+1  following from earlier assumptions) and hence the 
coefficient estimates in the pooled model converge to θ/( σa
2+1)
1/2, the so-called ‘population-
                                                 
6 Another common method of modelling the initial conditions is specified by Heckman (1981). This 
method ideally uses pre-survey information alongside the first period characteristics in the initial period 
equation to predict the initial condition.  INFORMAL ELDERLY CARE AND FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION ACROSS EUROPE | 5 
averaged parameters’. The pooled estimator is also robust to serial correlation in eit. In principle 
it would be possible to allow for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term using 
maximum simulated likelihood estimation (see for example Train, 2003 for a general 
introduction or Hyslop, 1999 for women’s labour force participation). Contoyannis et al. 
(2004b) however note that a specification that allows for heterogeneity, state dependence and 
serial correlation in eit  is difficult because of the problems of separately identifying state 
dependence and serial correlation. 
3.  The ECHP data 
3.1  Sample and variables 
This paper uses eight waves (1994-2001) of the ECHP. The ECHP is a large-scale comparative 
panel study across the EU-15. The ECHP was designed to develop comparable social indicators 
across the EU and covers a wide variety of range of topics such as labour market activity, 
education, income, health and demographic characteristics at the individual level. The panel 
nature of the data allows us to control not only for observable individual characteristics but also 
for the changes in individual and household circumstances and unobservable individual effects. 
In the first wave of interviews in 1994, data were collected for 12 EU member states: Belgium, 
Denmark, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. Austria entered in 1995, Finland in 1996 and Sweden in 1997. The choice 
of the countries is guided by the availability of data for each country. We drop the data from 
Luxembourg due to a small sample size and Sweden because information on care-giving is 
missing. Furthermore, Germany and the UK do not have ECHP data for waves 4-8, so the 
national panels – Germany’s SOEP and the UK’s BHPS – are used instead. For the German 
SOEP sample, care-giving is nearly an absorbing state (0.39 leaving non-CARE). Instead, we 
use the German ECHP for waves 1-3. For the UK, we use BHPS sample for waves 1-8.   
The subsequent analysis uses a sub-sample chosen according to the individual characteristics at 
the first date of interview. We restrict the sample to include women
7 aged between 20 and 59 
years inclusively, who are not in education or training and are not reported to be in early 
retirement
8 (see Table 1 for the number of remaining observations due to sample selection). 
Individuals remain in the sample at subsequent interviews until they exit the survey or have 
missing information on the variables of interest. Hence we use an unbalanced panel in which 
individuals are allowed to leave the sample. This selection allows us to 1) identify the lagged 
employment status and employment status at the first date of interview to control for initial 
conditions and 2) provide attrition-bias corrected estimates. 
                                                 
7 Women are more likely than men to provide informal care to the elderly (Wolf & Soldo, 1994). 
8 Retirement is mostly an absorbing state in Europe. 6 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
Table 1. Data selection (all countries) 
 Observations  after 
selection 
ECHP Period 1994-2001
(a) 909,423 
   
Reason for removal   
   
Out of age bracket (20-59)  630,288 
Male 321,911 
In education, training or early retirement  265,074 
Missing values on education, marital status or health  259,092 
Time gaps  242,415 
Not observed at first wave  197,044 
   
(a)  Sample of countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Finland,  
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
Table 2 defines the variables used in the empirical analysis of labour force participation 
dynamics and informal elderly care. Labour force participation (LFP) takes value 1 if the 
interviewee reports participating in paid employment. The CARE variable has been defined as 
taking the value 1 for interviewees who report looking after (without pay) a person who needs 
help because of old age, disability or illness other than a child. 
Table 2. Variable definitions 
Variable   Definition 
LFP  1 if in paid employment, 0 otherwise 
CARE  1 if caring for an elderly or disabled adult  
MARS1  1 if married, 0 otherwise 
MARS2  1 if separated or divorced, 0 otherwise 
MARS3  1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 
MARS4  1 if never married, 0 otherwise 
HIQ1  1 if highest schooling level is 3
rd level or above, 0 otherwise 
HIQ2  1 if highest schooling level is 2
nd stage of secondary level, 0 otherwise 
HIQ3  1 if highest schooling level is less than 2
nd stage of secondary level 
KIDS_LT13  1 if children aged strictly less than 13 present in household, 0 otherwise 
KIDS_GT13  1 if children aged greater than 13 present in household, 0 otherwise  
Bad health  1 if self-assessed health is reported poor or very poor, 0 otherwise 
HHSIZE  Number of people in household including respondent 
  
Source: Author’s data. 
3.2 Data  description 
The research question of interest is to examine the dynamics of employment (hereafter referred 
to as LFP) and the impact of informal caring upon it (hereafter referred to as CARE). The first 
column of Table 3 summarises LFP across the countries used in the analysis.  INFORMAL ELDERLY CARE AND FEMALE LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION ACROSS EUROPE | 7 
Table 3. Country-specific descriptive statistics on LFP and its persistence 
Country LFP Prob(LFPt=1|LFPt-
1=1) 
Prob(LFPt=0|LFPt-
1=0) 
      
AU  0.627 0.942 0.879 
BE  0.642 0.958 0.934 
DE  0.612 0.940 0.867 
DK  0.853 0.953 0.712 
FR  0.635 0.932 0.865 
FI  0.820 0.951 0.696 
GR  0.371 0.917 0.940 
IR  0.442 0.919 0.914 
IT  0.441 0.943 0.950 
NL  0.490 0.916 0.908 
PT  0.588 0.941 0.897 
SP  0.354 0.883 0.918 
UK  0.660 0.926 0.854 
      
Notes: Country abbreviations – AU Austria, BE Belgium, DE Germany, DK Denmark,  
FR France, FI Finland, GR Greece, IR Ireland, IT Italy, NL the Netherlands,  
PT Portugal, SP Spain and UK United Kingdom. 
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
Labour force participation rates vary considerably among the sample of countries. The highest 
participation rates are observed for Denmark (85.3%) and Finland (82%) while the lowest rates 
are observed for Greece (37.1%) and Spain (35.4%). Other countries that fall clear of the target 
of the European employment strategy (60% for women’s participation) are Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal.   
The second and third columns of Table 3 report the conditional probabilities for participation 
and non-participation, respectively, where LFPt=1 if the individual is employed at time t and 
zero otherwise.
9 The second column reports the probability of being employed at time t 
conditional on being employed at time t-1. All the countries in the sample exhibit a high degree 
of serial persistence in labour force participation. Obviously this simple analysis does not 
control for (observed or unobserved) individual heterogeneity. 
The regression analysis in the following section separates this observed serial persistence in 
LFP into true state dependence (i.e. the propensity to participate is changed because of past 
participation) and spurious state dependence (i.e. persistent individual heterogeneity causes 
participation propensities to differ irrespective of past participation). 
The third column Table 3 reports the probability of not being employed at t conditional on not 
being employed at time t-1. The lowest level of serial persistence in non-employment is 
observed for Denmark (71.2%) and Finland (69.6%). A very high level of serial persistence in 
non-participation may indicate countries where women permanently specialise in household 
production. The highest levels in persistence in non-participation in this sample of countries are 
observed in Belgium, Greece and Italy. 
                                                 
9 A disadvantage of this method of analysis is that the time interval between the observed states is a year 
and hence spells in LFP or CARE that last less than a year are not captured in the survey interviews and 
hence cannot be captured in this analysis. Nevertheless, this analysis can be interpreted as looking at the 
persistence in LFP and CARE status in the medium- rather than short-term transitions. 8 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
The ECHP also includes detailed information on the household and personal characteristics that 
are likely determinants of the LFP decision. Controls that are included in the analysis include: 
age groups (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54 and 55-59), dummies for the 
presence of pre-teen and teenage children,
10 a dichotomous variable for a second or a higher 
level of education and for very bad/bad health, an indicator of marital status (married, 
separated/divorced, widowed, never married) and household size as well as year and regional 
dummies.
11 Table 2 provides country-specific descriptive statistics on these control variables. 
Table 4 summarises the variables used in this study separately for each country. The proportion 
of women providing informal care to an elderly person varies between 3% in France to 12.5% in 
the UK. The very high UK figure is similar to that reported in Heitmueller (2004), which reports 
a figure of 15% for informal care-giving in the UK. Between 67% and 81% of the women in the 
sample are married, while a fairly constant 1-2% are widowed. The divorce/separation rates 
vary considerably between the southern countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 
Ireland with relatively low rates of between 3-5% and the other countries in the sample where 
divorce/separation rates are in excess of 8%. The level of highest qualification also varies 
considerably between countries; however, since these measurements depend crucially on the 
national educational system, they may not be comparable across countries (but are consistent 
within countries). 
Attrition is considerable in the ECHP (see country-specific attrition in Table 5).
12 Table 5 also 
reports the mean values of CARE and LFP measured at the first and the last observed waves. 
Whereas the proportion of caregivers does not change between the first- and last-wave 
interviewees, the LFP rates change considerably for most countries. Obviously the higher 
participation rates may be the result of improved macroeconomic circumstances; however, it 
may also be related to non-random attrition. 
To test whether attrition biases the empirical estimates, we use a test proposed by Verbeek & 
Nijman (1992). The test involves including the following variables in the dynamic model for an 
unbalanced panel: 1) the number of waves in which the individual participates (number of 
waves); 2) a binary indicator for participation in all waves (all waves) and; 3) a binary indicator 
for not responding in the following wave (next wave). These indicator variables should not enter 
the model significantly under the hypothesis of no selectivity bias.  
Table 6 reports this Verbeek & Nijman test for attrition and shows that attrition may bias the 
estimates for some of the countries in the sample. Specifically, for Austria all of the attrition 
bias indicators are significant, for Ireland and the UK the individuals who respond in all the 
waves are more likely to participate in the labour force. For Portugal, the number of waves is a 
significant predictor of work participation while the most common potential source of attrition 
bias is dropping out of the survey. The indicator for dropping out, the variable called ‘next 
wave’, is significant in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and the UK. In all cases, 
those who drop out at time t+1 are less likely to participate in the labour force at time t as 
expected. 
 
                                                 
10 The fertility variables (KIDS_LT13 and KIDS_GT13) are assumed to be exogenous in the analysis. 
This assumption for dynamic models is supported by Hyslop (1999), who concludes that “after 
controlling for serially correlated errors or state dependence, there is no evidence that fertility decisions 
are correlated with unobserved tastes for work” (p. 1278). 
11 The regional indicators are not available for the Netherlands or the German ECHP sample. 
12 Attrition rate is defined as the ratio of the number of dropouts between waves t and t-1 to the number of 
observations at t-1. | 9 
Table 4. Country-specific descriptive statistics 
  AU BE DE  DK FR  FI  GR  IR  IT  NL PT  SP  UK 
LFP 0.627 
(0.484) 
0.642 
(0.479) 
0.612 
(0.487) 
0.853 
(0.354) 
0.635 
(0.481) 
0.820 
(0.384) 
0.371 
(0.483) 
0.442 
(0.497) 
0.441 
(0.497) 
0.490 
(0.500) 
0.588 
(0.492) 
0.354 
(0.478) 
0.660 
(0.474) 
CARE 0.037 
(0.190) 
0.043 
(0.203) 
0.049 
(0.216) 
0.040 
(0.197) 
0.030 
(0.170) 
0.050 
(0.217) 
0.032 
(0.175) 
0.035 
(0.183) 
0.041 
(0.198) 
0.030 
(0.171) 
0.042 
(0.200) 
0.064 
(0.245) 
0.125 
(0.331) 
AGE  39.966    
(9.896) 
40.575    
(9.171) 
40.634 
(10.244) 
41.674    
(9.557) 
40.800    
(9.556) 
42.274    
(9.286) 
39.809    
(10.215) 
40.468    
(10.417) 
40.500    
(9.902) 
41.069    
(9.159) 
41.018    
(9.968) 
40.970    
(10.103) 
40.117    
(9.853) 
MARS1 0.728 
(0.445) 
0.738 
(0.440) 
0.763 
(0.425) 
0.665 
(0.472) 
0.685 
(0.465) 
0.716 
(0.451) 
0.814 
(0.389) 
0.747 
(0.435) 
0.785 
(0.411) 
0.768 
(0.422) 
0.784 
(0.411) 
0.781 
(0.413) 
0.680 
(0.466) 
MARS2 0.077 
(0.266) 
0.123 
(0.328) 
0.086 
(0.280) 
0.117 
(0.321) 
0.089 
(0.284) 
0.104 
(0.306) 
0.035 
(0.185) 
0.044 
(0.204) 
0.027 
(0.162) 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.049 
(0.217) 
0.044 
(0.205) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
MARS3 0.011 
(0.104) 
0.010 
(0.098) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.019 
(0.137) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.006 
(0.078) 
0.010 
(0.101) 
0.004 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.163) 
0.010 
(0.101) 
0.011 
(0.105) 
MARS4  0.185     
(0.388) 
0.129    
(0.335) 
0.137    
(0.343) 
0.199     
(0.399) 
0.200    
(0.400) 
0.162    
(0.368) 
0.136     
(0.343) 
0.204    
(0.403) 
0.178    
(0.382) 
0.147    
(0.355) 
0.139    
(0.346) 
0.164    
(0.371) 
0.166    
(0.372) 
HIQ1 0.086 
(0.280) 
0.370 
(0.483) 
0.132 
(0.339) 
0.375 
(0.484) 
0.242 
(0.428) 
0.437 
(0.496) 
0.212 
(0.409) 
0.146 
(0.353) 
0.069 
(0.254) 
0.115 
(0.319) 
0.065 
(0.246) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
0.351 
(0.477) 
HIQ2 0.636 
(0.481) 
0.328 
(0.470) 
0.569 
(0.495) 
0.421 
(0.494) 
0.314 
(0.464) 
0.363 
(0.481) 
0.300 
(0.458) 
0.400 
(0.490) 
0.371 
(0.483) 
0.375 
(0.484) 
0.102 
(0.302) 
0.157 
(0.363) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
HIQ3  0.278    
(0.448) 
0.302    
(0.459) 
0.299    
(0.458) 
0.204    
(0.403) 
0.444    
(0.497) 
0.200    
(0.400) 
0.488    
(0.500) 
0.454    
(0.498) 
0.560    
(0.496) 
0.510    
(0.500) 
0.834    
(0.372) 
0.658    
(0.474) 
0.511    
(0.500) 
KIDS_LT12 0.404 
(0.491) 
0.299 
(0.458) 
0.236 
(0.424) 
0.317 
(0.465) 
0.351 
(0.477) 
0.398 
(0.490) 
0.299 
(0.458) 
0.360 
(0.480) 
0.295 
(0.456) 
0.325 
(0.468) 
0.321 
(0.467) 
0.307 
(0.461) 
0.328 
(0.470) 
KIDS_GT13 0.090 
(0.286) 
0.074 
(0.261) 
0.053 
(0.224) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.099 
(0.298) 
0.096 
(0.294) 
0.105 
(0.306) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
0.097 
(0.296) 
0.078 
(0.268) 
Bad health  0.027 
(0.161) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
0.045 
(0.206) 
0.027 
(0.161) 
0.061 
(0.240) 
0.029 
(0.169) 
0.031 
(0.174) 
0.020 
(0.138) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
0.044 
(0.206) 
0.129 
(0.335) 
0.075 
(0.264) 
0.097 
(0.296) 
HHSIZE 3.536 
(1.464) 
3.312 
(1.282) 
3.066 
(1.242) 
3.004 
(1.244) 
3.305 
(1.383) 
3.185 
(1.369) 
3.657 
(1.173) 
4.379 
(1.768) 
3.707 
(1.209) 
3.157 
(1.276) 
3.884 
(1.507) 
3.884 
(1.354) 
3.144 
(1.248) 
N  9,451  10,040 8,087  8,167  23,354 8,522  14,968 13,210 26,856 17,490 15,091 23,581 18,227 
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
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Table 5. Sample sizes and attrition rates by wave and country 
Country  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 CARE
(a)  CARE
(b)  LFP
(a)  LFP
(b) 
AU N/A  2050 
 
1707 
[16.7%] 
1472 
[13.8%] 
1277 
[13.2%] 
1123 
[12.1%] 
959 
[14.6%] 
863 
[10.0%] 
0.039    
(0.194) 
0.039    
(0.195) 
0.588    
(0.492) 
0.655     
(0.476) 
BE 1891  1635 
[13.5%] 
1452 
[11.2%] 
1277 
[12.1%] 
1124 
[12.0%] 
987 
[12.2%] 
885 
[10.3%] 
789 
[10.8%] 
0.044    
(0.205) 
0.044    
(0.206) 
0.621    
(0.485) 
0.686    
(0.465) 
DE 3033 
 
2656 
[12.4%] 
2398 
[9.7%] 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.042       
(0.200) 
0.051    
(0.220) 
0.595    
(0.491) 
0.638    
(0.481) 
DK 1771 
 
1482 
[16.3%] 
1185 
[20.0%] 
975 
[17.7%] 
807 
[17.2%] 
720 
[10.8%] 
637 
[11.5%] 
590 
[7.4%] 
0.033    
(0.180) 
0.047     
(0.213) 
0.794    
(0.405) 
0.922    
(0.268) 
FR 4280 
 
3705 
[13.4%] 
3380 
[8.8%] 
2934 
[13.2%] 
2622 
[10.6%] 
2370 
[9.6%] 
2120 
[10.5%] 
1943 
[8.3%] 
0.032    
(0.175) 
0.025    
(0.155) 
0.578    
(0.494) 
0.679    
(0.467) 
FI  N/A N/A 2190 
 
1837 
[16.1%] 
1482 
[19.3%] 
1277 
[13.8%] 
913 
[28.5%] 
823 
[9.9%] 
0.050    
(0.217) 
0.056    
(0.230) 
0.757    
(0.429) 
0.893    
(0.309) 
GR 3172 
 
2562 
[19.2%] 
2194 
[14.4%] 
1880 
[14.3%] 
1558 
[17.1%] 
1323 
[15.1%] 
1178 
[11.0%] 
1101 
[6.5%] 
0.033    
(0.179) 
0.042    
(0.200) 
0.339    
(0.473) 
0.422    
(0.494) 
IR 3183 
 
2405 
[24.4%] 
1915 
[20.4%] 
1611 
[15.9%] 
1387 
[13.9%] 
1130 
[18.5%] 
859 
[24.0%] 
720 
[16.2%] 
0.034    
(0.180) 
0.029    
(0.168) 
0.418    
(0.493) 
0.513    
(0.500) 
IT 4868 
 
4339 
[10.9%] 
3948 
[9.0%] 
3450 
[12.6%] 
3029 
[12.2%] 
2707 
[10.6%] 
2406 
[11.1%] 
2109 
[12.3%] 
0.046    
(0.210) 
0.042    
(0.201) 
0.425    
(0.494) 
0.459    
(0.498) 
NL 3122 
 
2789 
[10.7%] 
2556 
[8.4%] 
2288 
[10.5%] 
2022 
[11.6%] 
1809 
[10.5%] 
1552 
[14.2%] 
1352 
[12.9%] 
0.030    
(0.171 
0.036    
(0.185) 
0.469    
(0.499) 
0.535    
(0.499) 
PT 2773 
 
2398 
[13.5%] 
2120 
[11.6%] 
1908 
[10.0%] 
1701 
[10.8%] 
1544 
[9.2%] 
1375 
[10.9%] 
1272 
[7.5%] 
0.036    
(0.186) 
0.040   
(0.196) 
0.523    
(0.500) 
0.637    
(0.481) 
SP 5021 
 
4004 
[20.3%] 
3408 
[14.9%] 
2894 
[15.1%] 
2482 
[14.2%] 
2180 
[12.2%] 
1889 
[13.3%] 
1703 
[9.8%] 
0.067    
(0.249) 
0.070     
(0.255) 
0.319     
(0.466) 
0.416    
(0.493) 
UK 3007 
 
2671 
[11.2%] 
2477 
[7.3%] 
2301 
[7.1%] 
2153 
[6.4%] 
1999 
[7.2%] 
1877 
[6.1%] 
1742 
[7.2%] 
0.121    
(0.326) 
0.154    
(0.361) 
0.639    
(0.481) 
0.689    
(0.463) 
(a)  Denotes the mean value in the first observed wave. 
(b)  Denotes the mean value in the last observed wave. 
Notes: AU enters the survey in 1995, FI in 1996. Final year for DE is 1996. Square brackets report the attrition rate. Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Source: Author calculations on the ECHP. 
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Table 6. The Verbeek & Nijman test for attrition (based on dynamic probit model with a Wooldridge specification for initial conditions and correlated 
effects) 
  AU BE DE DK FR FI  GR IR  IT  NL PT SP  UK 
               
All waves  -0.676 
(0.210) 
0.341 
(0.234) 
0.790 
(0.650) 
0.180 
(0.193) 
0.142 
(0.113) 
0.425 
(0.219) 
0.144 
(0.207) 
0.563 
(0.157) 
0.217 
(0.158) 
-0.070 
(0.111) 
0.174 
(0.168) 
-0.148 
(0.126) 
0.299    
(0.123) 
Number of 
waves 
0.135 
(0.061) 
-0.086 
(0.063) 
-0.402 
(0.446) 
0.067 
(0.048) 
-0.006 
(0.031) 
-0.076 
(0.087) 
0.019 
(0.053) 
-0.060 
(0.038) 
0.002 
(0.038) 
-0.046 
(0.034) 
0.156 
(0.046) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
-0.017    
(0.036) 
Next wave  -0.482 
(0.117) 
-0.374 
(0.136) 
-0.314 
(0.352) 
-0.337 
(0.108) 
-0.086 
(0.072) 
-0.602 
(0.149) 
0.097 
(0.103) 
-0.137 
(0.086) 
-0.123 
(0.078) 
-0.086 
(0.079) 
-0.233 
(0.093) 
-0.034 
(0.067) 
-0.245    
(0.090) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 5% level indicated in bold font.  
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
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Since it is apparent that the estimates for some of the countries may be biased due to non-
random attrition, we also provide attrition-corrected estimates. Specifically, we allow for 
attrition by adopting an inverse probability weighted estimator (IPW) with the pooled probit 
model (Wooldridge, 2002). This method assumes that attrition can be treated as ignorable non-
response, conditional on characteristics observed in the first wave. Specifically, probits are 
estimated for response vs. non-response at each wave of the panel using the initial sample of 
individuals observed in the first wave. The inverse of the fitted probabilities from these probits 
is then used to weight the observations in the pooled probit model. A similar strategy for dealing 
with potential attrition bias has previously been adopted by for example Contoyannis et al. 
(2004a). 
4. Results 
The section reports the estimates of the impact of informal caring on women’s labour force 
participation (LFP) using both static and dynamic specifications. Table 7 reveals the coefficient 
estimates for the main variables of interest – informal caring and lagged labour force 
participation. To assess the magnitude of the estimated effects, Table 8 shows average partial 
effects (APE), averaged over individual heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) as follows: 
 
∑
=
−
− + + + + Φ
N
i
i a i a a t a a t z y y z N
1
2 0 1 0 1 1 2
1 ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( α α α θ θ
 (4) 
where subscript α denotes multiplication by (1+σ2)-1/2 in the random effects model only. The 
empirical specification across all countries also includes controls for individual and household 
characteristics (see the appendix for complete country-specific results). 
State dependence 
The first row of Table 7 reports the estimate for the impact of informal caring on LFP in a static 
set-up controlling for observed heterogeneity. In this framework, caring is found to have a 
significant, negative impact on LFP in the majority of the countries in the sample (FR, IR, IT, 
NL, PT, SP and the UK). Yet, a simple pooled, static model such as this does not allow the 
estimates to reflect the persistence in labour force participation observed in Table 3, resulting 
from both spurious state dependence (unobserved heterogeneity) and true state dependence. 
Both of these concerns are addressed in the dynamic models that are presented in rows two and 
three of Table 7. 
First of all, the estimates of the pooled probit (second row of Table 7) show evidence of strong 
persistence in labour force participation: the coefficient on lagged LFP is positive and highly 
significant in all of the countries in the sample. The corresponding average partial effects are 
reported in Table 8 and the magnitude of state dependence is estimated to range between the 
low of 0.09 in Germany to the high of 0.399 in the UK. In other words, for example in the UK, 
participating in the labour force at time t-1 increases the probability of labour force participation 
at time t by 40 percentage points. Comparable estimates for the US find a 37 percentage-point 
state dependence (Hyslop, 1999). The impact of informal elderly care on the probability of 
labour force participation is negative or zero as expected in most countries; but these estimates 
are significant only Germany and Italy with 0.4 and 0.2 percentage-point impacts respectively.  
Whereas the pooled estimates are consistent even to the presence of serial correlation in the 
error term, they are inefficient. The results using a more efficient estimator, the random effects 
probit, are reported in the third row of Table 7 with the corresponding average partial effects 
reported in the second row of Table 8.  | 13 
Table 7. Labour force participation (coefficient estimates) 
  AU BE DE DK FR  FI  GR IR  IT  NL PT  SP  UK 
               
Static  probit               
CARE 0.083 
(0.115) 
-0.028 
(0.106) 
-0.166 
(0.089) 
-0.085 
(0.133) 
-0.228 
(0.082) 
-0.131 
(0.105) 
-0.028 
(0.099) 
-0.431 
(0.118) 
-0.305 
(0.069) 
-0.374 
(0.108) 
-0.293 
(0.090) 
-0.146 
(0.061) 
-0.176 
(0.053) 
Log  likelihood  -5185.8 -5144.6 -4647.8 -2943.8 -13325.1  -3560.9 -8186.0 -7132.2 -14703.8  -10063.8  -8576.4 -12074.6  -10156.8 
N  9,451  10,040 8,087  8,167  23,354 8,522  14,968 13,210 26,856 17,490 15,091 23,581 18,227 
               
P o o l e d   p r o b i t                
LFPT-1  1.188 
(0.049) 
2.111 
(0.075) 
0.524 
(0.045) 
1.373 
(0.076) 
1.873 
(0.039) 
1.549 
(0.075) 
2.194 
(0.057) 
1.474 
(0.050) 
1.314 
(0.035) 
2.124 
(0.048) 
1.064 
(0.040) 
1.606 
(0.039) 
2.029 
(0.044) 
CARE 0.019 
(0.129) 
-0.138 
(0.151) 
-0.233 
(0.124) 
-0.065 
(0.162) 
-0.158 
(0.091) 
-0.180 
(0.113) 
-0.071 
(0.122) 
-0.103 
(0.137) 
-0.207 
(0.081) 
0.001 
(0.133) 
-0.251 
(0.088) 
-0.077 
(0.067) 
-0.106 
(0.060) 
Log  likelihood  -4052.3 -1728.5 -2832.2 -1537.4 -5715.6 -1756.7 -2836.8 -3699.4 -8035.9 -3910.0 -5712.4 -5963.4 -4438.5 
               
R E   P r o b i t                
LFPT-1  0.667 
(0.068) 
[0.275] 
1.414 
(0.089) 
[0.788] 
0.259 
(0.094) 
[0.097] 
0.888   
(0.092) 
[0.633] 
1.293   
(0.044) 
[0.849] 
0.843   
(0.092) 
[0.520] 
1.288 
(0.072) 
[0.727] 
0.978    
(0.060) 
[0.526] 
0.897 
(0.047) 
[0.335] 
1.425   
(0.061) 
[1.016] 
0.656 
(0.052) 
[0.279] 
0.861 
(0.047) 
[0.521] 
1.399   
(0.054) 
[1.038] 
CARE 0.157 
(0.204) 
[0.022] 
0.155   
(0.224) 
[0.105] 
-0.612    
(0.243) 
[-0.229] 
-0.032   
(0.210) 
[-0.059] 
-0.163   
(0.131) 
[-0.123] 
-0.359    
(0.227) 
[-0.216] 
-0.160 
(0.194) 
[-0.080] 
-0.204   
(0.185) 
[-0.090] 
-0.226 
(0.129) 
[-0.096] 
-0.034  
(0.162) 
[-0.023] 
-0.179 
(0.140) 
[-0.076] 
-0.021 
(0.104) 
[-0.003] 
-0.141   
(0.083) 
[-0.105] 
Ρ  0.854 
(0.012) 
0.697   
(0.028) 
0.860 
(0.013) 
0.546 
(0.041) 
0.553 
(0.020) 
0.613   
0.036 
0.686 
(0.025) 
0.711   
(0.017) 
0.835 
(0.007) 
0.493 
(0.030) 
0.819 
(0.009) 
0.659 
(0.016) 
0.450    
0.027 
Log likelihood   -2836.3  -1519.6  -2266.2  -1446.9 -5300.6 -1642.  9  -2600.9 -3056.3 -5226.8 -3802.9 -3842.8 -5293.5 -4320.9 
               
Feedback from  
CARET+1 LFPT  
No Yes 
1% 
No No Yes 
5% 
No No No Yes 
5% 
No No No Yes 
10% 
N  8,548 8,231 5,881 6,489 19,194  6,470 11,834  10,402  23,009  14,369  13,125  18,889  15,220 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 5% level indicated in bold font. RE probit coefficients multiplied by (1+σ
2)
-1/2 reported in square 
brackets. All specifications include controls for: married, separated/divorced, widowed, (omitted: single); age 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 
(omitted: 20-24); 3rd level qualification, 2nd level qualification (omitted: less than 2nd level qualification); bad health; household size; presence of children 
aged 13+; regional dummies (not available for: NL), wave dummies.  
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 14 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
Table 8. Labour force participation (average partial effects) 
 AU  BE  DE  DK  FR  FI  GR  IR  IT  NL  PT  SP  UK 
               
Pooled 
probit               
LFPt-1  0.217 0.354 0.090 0.252 0.346 0.321 0.246 0.196 0.167 0.310 0.156 0.185 0.399
CARE  -
0.000 
-
0.000
-
0.004 
-
0.001 
-
0.001
-
0.001
-
0.000
-
0.001
-
0.002 0.000 -
0.003 
-
0.001 
-
0.002
               
RE 
Probit               
LFP t-1  0.050 0.100 0.013 0.091 0.130 0.076 0.070 0.064 0.041 0.129 0.042 0.055 0.178
CARE 0.001  0.001 -
0.003 
-
0.000 
-
0.001
-
0.002
-
0.000
-
0.001
-
0.001
-
0.000
-
0.001 
-
0.000 
-
0.003
               
Notes: Statistical significance at 5% level indicated in bold font. Statistical significance is based on the 
underlying coefficient estimate.  
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
A comparison of the pooled versus random effects estimates shows, first of all, that allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model has a big improvement on its fit for all countries as 
measured by the log-likelihood value. Second of all, the estimates for state dependence are 
lower but still highly significant for all the countries in the sample. To compare the coefficient 
estimates across the two specifications, Table 7 reports also the coefficient estimate multiplied 
by (1+σ2)-1/2 in square brackets. A comparison of the coefficient estimates indicates that the 
random effects estimates are always half or less than the magnitude of the pooled probit 
coefficient estimates. To talk about the magnitudes of the estimated effects, the average partial 
effect reported in Table 8 shows a clear reduction in the estimate of state dependence compared 
with the pooled estimates. This is driven by the fact that the relative magnitudes of the effects of 
lagged LFP relative to LFP0 are reversed in the random effects models compared with the 
pooled models (see the appendix for country-specific estimates on this). The positive state 
dependence, however, remains highly significant in all of the countries. The lowest estimate for 
state dependence is found for Germany (1.3 percentage points) while the highest is estimated for 
the UK (18 percentage points). Most of the other country estimates for state dependence in 
labour force participation lie between 5 and 10 percentage points, except for FR and NL with 
the slightly higher values of 13 percentage points. 
The impact of informal elderly care on labour force participation probabilities remains 
significant only in Germany with an estimate of a negative impact of 0.3 percentage points. 
Hence a comparison of the random effects estimates with the static probit estimates indicates 
that, first of all, true state dependency accounts for some of the observed labour supply 
behaviour. It is of interest also to examine the extent of the unobserved heterogeneity upon it. 
This can be assessed within the random-effects probit framework. 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
The estimate of ρ in Table 7 reports the share of unobserved heterogeneity in the error variance. 
Hyslop (1999) estimates the share of unobserved heterogeneity to account for 49% of the total 
error variance for the labour force participation of women in the US. The UK estimate reported 
in Table 7 is of similar magnitude (45%), which is also the lowest estimate in the sample of 
countries. In the estimates for Austria, Belgium, Italy and Portugal the unobserved 
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Other explanatory variables 
The appendix reports the coefficient estimates for other control variables used in the analysis. In 
most countries, married women are less likely to work than single women. Only in Denmark, 
France, Finland and the UK is this not the case. In most countries being separated/divorced or 
widowed makes no significant difference in the participation probabilities compared with single 
women. Education has the expected impact on the probability of labour force participation with 
more educated women in all the countries being more likely to work.  
The indicator variable for the presence of pre-teen children is negative and significant for the 
following countries: AU, DE, DK, FR, IR, NL, SP and the UK. This may be related to, for 
example, excess demand for formal childcare (for the UK evidence, see Chevalier & Viitanen, 
2003 and for German evidence, Wrohlich, 2005). This is supported by the fact that the 
coefficient estimate for Finland is not statistically significant and that in Finland the 
municipalities have a legal requirement to provide a childcare place for any child requiring one. 
The presence of teenage children in the household reduces the probability of labour force 
participation in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Bad health has a significant negative impact on participation in most countries, except for 
Belgium, France, Finland and Greece. This may indicate that disability legislation is stronger or 
better enforced in these countries or that individuals in poor health receive some other form of 
support to enable them to work. Further analysis would be of interest to examine the reasons for 
these differences. Household size has a negative impact on the probability of labour force 
participation in BE, DE, FR, IR, IT, NL, PT and SP. This partly captures the number of children 
in the household but may also indicate that the household includes inhabitants from more than 
two generations.  
All of the estimated dynamic models parameterise the unobserved individual effect as a function 
of mean of time-varying regressors, the correlated effects and a dummy variable for the first 
period observation on the dependent variable. The correlated effects reported in the appendix 
allow us to examine which of the control variables are correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity. The presence of pre-teen children is significant only in Germany and Ireland as 
well as in Spain in the random effects specification and in Belgium in the pooled probit 
specification. The presence of teenage children is positively correlated with the unobservables 
in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK as well as Spain in the random effects specification. 
Bad health is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity in FR, IR, NL, PT, SP and the UK as 
well as FI in the random effects specification only. Finally, the mean of the informal elderly 
care is significant only Ireland as well as in Italy and Portugal in the random effects 
specification only.  
Feedback effects 
A drawback of the random effects estimation is the assumption of strict exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. A simple test to examine whether this assumption holds is to test for 
feedback effects from CAREt+1 to LFPt. While the complete regression results are not reported 
(these are available from the author on request), a summary of this test is reported in the bottom 
of Table 7. The countries for which there are significant feedback effects include Belgium, 
France, Italy (all at 5% levels) and the UK (at a 10% level of significance). The presence of 
feedback from the explanatory variables renders the random effects estimates potentially biased. 
Nevertheless, for these countries the pooled estimator is consistent, although inefficient, as it 
avoids the strict exogeneity assumption. For example, the pooled estimator is robust to serial 
correlation. A similar allowance for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term for the 
random effects model requires estimation using Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.  | 16 
 
 
 
Table 9. Attrition-corrected estimates for selected countries 
 AU  BE  DK  FI  IR  PT  UK 
         
Pooled probit – no attrition correction               
LFPT-1  1.188 
(0.049) 
[0.217] 
2.111 
(0.075) 
[0.354] 
1.373 
(0.076) 
[0.252] 
1.549 
(0.075) 
[0.321] 
1.474 
(0.050) 
[0.196] 
1.064 
(0.040) 
[0.156] 
2.029 
(0.044) 
[0.399] 
CARE 0.019 
(0.129) 
[-0.000] 
-0.138 
(0.151) 
[-0.000] 
-0.065 
(0.162) 
[-0.001] 
-0.180 
(0.113) 
[-0.001] 
-0.103 
(0.137) 
[-0.001] 
-0.251 
(0.088) 
[-0.003] 
-0.106 
(0.060) 
[-0.002] 
Log likelihood  -4052.3  -1728.5  -1537.4 -1756.7 -3699.4 -5712.4 -4438.5 
         
Pooled probit – IPW attrition correction               
LFPT-1  0.858 
(0.061) 
[0.162] 
2.037 
(0.090) 
[0.350] 
1.329 
(0.092) 
[0.238] 
1.175 
(0.120) 
[0.229] 
1.430 
(0.053) 
[0.192] 
1.046 
(0.049) 
[0.160] 
1.972 
(0.065) 
[0.386] 
CARE -0.106 
(0.166) 
[-0.001] 
-0.259 
(0.166) 
[-0.001] 
0.128 
(0.186) 
[0.001] 
0.086 
(0.197) 
[0.001] 
-0.156 
(0.144) 
[-0.001] 
-0.216 
(0.086) 
[-0.002] 
-0.010 
(0.082) 
[-0.000] 
Log likelihood  -4556.6  -1815.3  -1377.0 -2086.1 -3698.4 -5354.9 -4679.6 
         
Notes: Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Average partial effects reported in square brackets.  
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
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The pooled estimator does not change the conclusion on the impact of CARE on labour force 
participation for the countries with feedback effects except for Italy. The results indicate a 
significant negative impact of informal caring in Italy, which are in line with the findings by 
Marenzi & Pagani (2004).  
Attrition bias 
Since the Verbeek & Nijman (1992) test for attrition indicated that exit from the ECHP may be 
non-random in some of the countries, attrition-corrected estimates have been proved here. Table 
9 reports the pooled probit estimates without attrition correction and with the IPW attrition 
correction that was discussed in section 3. The results are provided for the coefficient estimates 
and, in square brackets, the average partial effects. 
Non-random attrition from the panel does not affect the estimates for informal care as for most 
countries they remain insignificant. For Portugal, the estimate for informal elderly care is 
statistically significant with the magnitude reduced slightly with the IPW correction. Regarding 
the estimates of state dependence in labour force participation, however, both Austria and 
Finland exhibit that non-random attrition from the panel indeed biases the estimates 
considerably. For Austria, the state dependence reduces from 21.7 to 16.2 percentage points and 
in Finland from 32.1 to 22.9 percentage points after correcting the estimates for attrition.   
Sub-sample analysis 
As shown in the descriptive analysis (Figure 1), the impact of CARE may be influenced by the 
age of the respondent, with older women being more likely to care for an elderly person – e.g. 
their own or their partner’s parent(s). Further, single women may be more likely to care for an 
elderly person as a result of fewer commitments competing for their time. To investigate these 
possibilities further, the sample is split into age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50-59) and also 
into marital status groups (married or single) based on the characteristic at the first wave.
13 The 
estimates for separated/divorced women were not significant in any country and hence the 
estimates are not reported. For each sub-sample a dynamic pooled probit model controlling is 
estimated for the initial conditions and correlated effects. The estimates for AU, BE, DK, FI, IR, 
PT and UK are corrected for non-random panel attrition with IPW correction. 
It is likely that the impact of CARE on LFP varies by the individual characteristics of the 
respondent. Specifically, it is reasonable to assume that informal caring will be less of a choice 
for more mature women and thus possibly more of an employment constraint. In the following 
analysis, this hypothesis is confirmed for several countries. Table 10 presents the coefficient 
estimates and the corresponding standard errors of a dynamic pooled probit with IPW correction 
for countries that have a potential attrition bias. The complete regression results are available on 
request.  
Middle-aged women in many of the countries in the sample are constrained in their labour force 
participation owing to informal elderly care: 45-49 year old women in Germany exhibit 
significant negative effects and a 10% level of significance in Austria, France, Greece and 
Portugal. Figure 1 shows that the incidence of caring increases dramatically from age 40 
onwards reaching a peak in the mid-50s. Although this analysis does not constitute a proper test 
of causality, it is noteworthy to point out that that from mid-40s onwards LFP also decreases 
considerably, which could indicate causality. Furthermore, this is not likely to be a cohort effect 
since the state dependence estimates for 40-59 year olds are all of similar magnitude regardless 
of age cohort. 
                                                 
13 The group ‘widowed’ is too small in most countries for consistent analysis. | 18 
 
Table 10. Impact of CARE on LFP by age group and marital status  
  AU BE DE DK FR  FI  GR IR  IT  NL PT  SP  UK 
               
A g e   g r o u p                
20-39 -0.167 
(0.377) 
-0.376 
(0.305) 
-0.482 
(0.340) 
-0.264 
(0.497) 
-0.321 
(0.209) 
0.314 
(0.477) 
-0.062 
(0.358) 
-0.430 
(0.320) 
-0.526 
(0.145) 
0.245 
(0.387) 
-0.201 
(0.174) 
-0.033 
(0.180) 
-0.073 
(0.146) 
40-44 0.104 
(0.363) 
0.156 
(0.353) 
-0.372 
(0.337) 
0.436 
(0.437) 
0.079 
(0.245) 
0.911 
(0.318) 
-0.081 
(0.281) 
-0.466 
(0.401) 
-0.006 
(0.216) 
-0.609 
(0.466) 
-0.044 
(0.183) 
-0.124 
(0.192) 
0.146 
(0.223) 
45-49 -0.470 
(0.272)  
0.037 
(0.364) 
-0.703 
(0.287) 
0.280 
(0.453) 
-0.417 
(0.221) 
0.123 
(0.265) 
-0.524 
(0.323) 
0.007 
(0.256) 
-0.048 
(0.163) 
-0.217 
(0.316) 
-0.382 
(0.204)  
0.114 
(0.145) 
-0.139 
(0.204) 
50-54 -0.285 
(0.298) 
-1.107 
(0.319) 
-0.316 
(0.265) 
0.170 
(0.485) 
-0.153 
(0.253) 
0.136 
(0.214) 
0.083 
(0.394) 
0.195 
(0.288) 
-0.254 
(0.173) 
0.022 
(0.281) 
-0.329 
(0.207) 
-0.071 
(0.147) 
0.213 
(0.215) 
55-59 0.197 
(0.309) 
0.044 
(0.406) 
0.092 
(0.188) 
0.113 
(0.325) 
-0.303 
(0.247) 
-0.918 
(0.365) 
0.104 
(0.240) 
-0.346 
(0.257) 
-0.323 
(0.276) 
0.527 
(0.380) 
-0.091 
(0.230) 
-0.265 
(0.180) 
0.016 
(0.256) 
               
M a r i t a l   s t a t u s                
Married -0.146 
(0.195) 
-0.332 
(0.212) 
-0.275 
(0.127) 
-0.002 
(0.220) 
-0.207 
(0.106) 
0.079 
(0.215) 
0.050 
(0.159) 
-0.244 
(0.168) 
-0.266 
(0.105) 
0.111 
(0.155) 
-0.159 
(0.099) 
-0.066 
(0.082) 
0.097 
(0.098) 
Never married  -0.029 
(0.388) 
-0.079 
(0.316) 
-1.256 
(0.569) 
-0.144 
(0.443) 
-0.201 
(0.238) 
0.313 
(0.489) 
-0.431 
(0.221) 
-0.118 
(0.284) 
-0.322 
(0.144) 
-0.586 
(0.292) 
-0.295 
(0.200) 
-0.036 
(0.131) 
-0.320 
(0.221) 
               
Notes: Pooled dynamic probit coefficient estimates with IPW correction for AU, BE, DK, FI, IR, PT, UK. Statistical significance at 5% level indicated in bold font.  
Source: Author calculations based on the ECHP. 
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A few interesting peculiarities are present as well. First, young women in Italy are constrained 
in LFP due to elderly care. This may be caused by, for example, a clash of career-oriented and 
traditional roles or the prevalence of ‘sandwich’ generation women who have caring 
responsibilities both to the following and the preceding generations (Marenzi & Pagani, 2004). 
Second, Finnish women are constrained in LFP at a later age than women in the other countries 
in the analysis. This may be owing to, for example, better health of the elderly until a later age 
or later fertility for the parents’ of the 55-59 year old respondents. Also, surprisingly, 40-44 year 
old Finnish women increase their labour force participation as a result of elderly care. This may 
be related to an income effect (whereas usually the substitution effect would prevail) or possibly 
resulting from the generous benefits for elderly care in Finland, which would not count as 
income for the carer.
14  
It is also informative and highly policy-relevant to examine the results by marital status. If, for 
example, unmarried women are constrained in their employment because of informal caring, 
then they themselves may incur a greater a risk of old-age poverty as a result of, for example, 
lower pension savings. Table 10 shows that this may indeed be an issue. Single women are 
constrained in labour force participation due to elderly care responsibilities in Germany, Greece, 
Italy and the Netherlands. Although married women also are constrained in Italy and Germany, 
the magnitude of the estimates is larger for single women. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence on the impact of informal care-giving to the elderly on the labour 
force participation of women across 13 European countries. The previous analyses using the 
ECHP to examine this topic do not fully exploit the panel nature of the data and rely on strict 
assumptions regarding the unobservables, both at the individual and at the country level. The 
analysis in this paper has two focal points: the relative contributions of state dependence as well 
as observed and unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the dynamics in women’s labour force 
participation and the existence and consequences of non-random attrition from the panel.  
Non-random attrition from the ECHP is shown to exert a small bias in the results for state 
dependence in some of the countries used in the analysis. Nevertheless, the differences between 
the attrition-corrected estimates and those without correction show that the bias is not nearly as 
bad as what one could expect from the large raw attrition rates.
15 Hence, the effect of attrition 
may be absorbed into the initial conditions and correlated effects. 
Allowing for persistence in labour force participation is important: estimates from models 
controlling for both spurious and true state dependence differ considerably from a simple static 
probit model. Models controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity show 
substantial positive state dependence and unobserved permanent heterogeneity in women’s 
labour force participation across the sample of countries. In the models, unobservable 
heterogeneity accounts for 45-86% of the unexplained variation in labour force participation. 
The analysis by sub-samples for different age groups and marital status offer two key 
observations. First, as expected, elderly care responsibilities increase with age and constrain 
women from participating in the labour force during their middle age, which – owing to the 
significant positive state dependence – results in lower labour force participation until the 
                                                 
14 It is worth pointing out that the positive impact for 40-44 year olds in Finland (sample size 1,102) is 
similar in magnitude (and significant) even without IPW attrition correction, however, in the random 
effects specification the coefficient is no longer significant. 
15 Ziliak & Kniesner (1998), using the PSID, also find a negligible influence of attrition bias in a model of 
life cycle labour supply. 20 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
retirement age. Second, single women with elderly care responsibilities may incur a greater risk 
of old-age poverty resulting from less attachment to the labour force and hence lower pension 
savings. The results indicate that this is a significant possibility in Germany, Greece, Italy and 
the Netherlands. 
Overall the results indicate that informal elderly care decreases women’s labour force 
participation in most of the 13 EU countries analysed at some point in their lifetime. The 
presence of state dependence means that short-term policy interventions, such as increased 
labour market flexibility to care for an elderly person, may have longer term implications. 
Measures to help women to combine caring responsibilities (both elderly care and child care) 
with labour market participation may provide the crucial policy instruments in many countries 
to attain the European Commission target of 60% employment rates for women. 
 | 21 
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Appendix 
 
Specifications for all countries also include controls for age groups: 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 
45-49, 50-54, 55-59 (omitted: 20-24), region (except DE, NL) and wave. 
 
Austria 
  Static probit  Pooled probit  RE probit 
 Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE Coefficient  SE 
CARE  0.083  0.115 0.019  0.129 0.157  0.204 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.188  0.049 0.667  0.068 
MARS1  -0.789  0.088 -0.584  0.092 -1.120  0.188 
MARS2  -0.094  0.130 -0.036  0.131 -0.271  0.281 
MARS3  -0.297  0.212 -0.466  0.211 -1.052  0.422 
KIDS_LT13  -0.537  0.076 -0.334  0.096 -0.671  0.152 
KIDS_GT13 -0.156  0.079  -0.104 0.084  -0.183 0.151 
HIQ1  0.941  0.127 0.904  0.130 2.197  0.268 
HIQ2  0.420  0.065 0.374  0.066 0.733  0.154 
Bad  health  -0.510  0.135 -0.502  0.137 -0.552  0.230 
HHSIZE  -0.054  0.022 -0.098  0.037 -0.084  0.049 
Work0 –  –  -0.052  0.064  1.098  0.170 
Constant  1.945  0.155 0.725  0.179 2.503  0.376 
           
Correlated  effects           
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.041  0.241 0.756  0.582 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.226  0.137 -0.231  0.285 
Bad  health  –  – 0.210  0.286 0.130  0.533 
HHSIZE –  –  0.071  0.045  -0.075  0.111 
CARE  –  – 0.183  0.294 0.101  0.619 
        
σa  – –  2.415  0.119 
Ρ  – –  0.854  0.012 
      
Log likelihood  -5185.843  -4052.267  -2836.3 
N 9,451  8,548  8,548 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 24 | TARJA K. VIITANEN 
 
Belgium 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.028 0.106 -0.138 0.151  0.155 0.224 
LFPt-1  –  – 2.111  0.075 1.414  0.089 
MARS1  -0.172 0.107 -0.226 0.115 -0.348 0.208 
MARS2  -0.242 0.130 -0.245 0.128 -0.374 0.243 
MARS3  0.867 0.318  0.611 0.382  0.629 0.583 
KIDS_LT13  -0.089 0.062  0.053 0.084  0.005 0.115 
KIDS_GT13 0.174  0.084  0.140 0.101  0.217 0.154 
HIQ1  1.310 0.079  0.753 0.084  1.210 0.143 
HIQ2  0.520 0.067  0.292 0.069  0.333 0.110 
Bad health  -0.793  0.119  -0.425 0.177 -0.325 0.218 
HHSIZE  -0.189 0.029 -0.305 0.069 -0.194 0.074 
Work0  –  – 0.932  0.082 3.286  0.238 
Constant 0.566  0.193  -0.904 0.222 -1.218 0.414 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.083  0.244 0.450  0.489 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.441 0.207 -0.231 0.321 
Bad  health  –  – -0.120 0.314 -0.917 0.550 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.255  0.077 0.024  0.097 
CARE  –  –  0.259 0.277 -0.269 0.509 
        
σa –  –  1.516  0.100 
ρ –  –  0.697  0.028 
Log likelihood  -5144.553  -1728.526  -1519.589 
N 10,040  8,231  8,231 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
Germany 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.166 0.089 -0.233 0.124 -0.612 0.243 
LFPt-1  –  – 0.524  0.045 0.259  0.094 
MARS1  -0.600 0.090 -0.483 0.110 -0.992 0.255 
MARS2  -0.311 0.116 -0.324 0.138 -0.681 0.346 
MARS3  -0.072 0.228 -0.182 0.215 -0.345 0.634 
KIDS_LT13  -0.588 0.054 -0.298 0.065 -0.247 0.120 
KIDS_GT13 0.102  0.095  0.212 0.113  0.439 0.236 
HIQ1  0.695 0.078  0.623 0.089  1.477 0.234 
HIQ2  0.165 0.051  0.168 0.059  0.271 0.144 
Bad health  -0.507  0.094  -0.505 0.114 -0.542 0.235 
HHSIZE  -0.261 0.023 -0.316 0.038 -0.653 0.074 
Work0  –  – 0.887  0.059 3.425  0.228 
Constant  1.367 0.122  0.121 0.172  0.493 0.461 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – -0.219 0.235 -0.017 0.546 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.649 0.131 -1.861 0.322 
Bad  health  –  –  0.211 0.191 -0.744 0.462 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.185  0.041 0.307  0.100 
CARE  –  – 0.374  0.247 0.642  0.569 
        
σa –  –  2.482  0.130 
ρ –  –  0.860  0.013 
Log likelihood   -4647.757  -2832.223  -2266.2 
N 8,087  5,881  5,881 
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Denmark 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.085 0.133 -0.065 0.162 -0.032 0.210 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.373  0.076 0.888  0.092 
MARS1  0.069 0.088 -0.072 0.093 -0.120 0.131 
MARS2  -0.047 0.110 -0.081 0.121 -0.189 0.170 
MARS3  0.723 0.219  0.256 0.260  0.262 0.394 
KIDS_LT13  -0.085 0.075 -0.247 0.141 -0.334 0.167 
KIDS_GT13 0.099  0.113  -0.359 0.143 -0.473 0.190 
HIQ1  0.889 0.080  0.529 0.085  0.651 0.125 
HIQ2  0.523 0.074  0.283 0.076  0.365 0.112 
Bad health  -1.067  0.114  -0.883 0.164 -1.159 0.196 
HHSIZE  -0.070 0.031 -0.102 0.056 -0.090 0.069 
Work0  –  – 0.696  0.085 1.761  0.177 
Constant 0.397  0.139  -0.946 0.236 -1.188 0.295 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.712  0.334 1.302  0.490 
KIDS_LT13  –  – 0.023  0.217 0.189  0.298 
Bad  health  –  – -0.511 0.303 -1.142 0.449 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.190  0.066 0.175  0.088 
CARE  –  – 0.134  0.278 0.066  0.417 
      
σa –  –  1.097  0.091 
ρ –  –  0.546  0.041 
Log likelihood   -2943.841  -1537.398  -1446.893 
N 8,167  6,489  6,489 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
France 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.228 0.082 -0.158 0.091 -0.163 0.131 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.873  0.039 1.293  0.044 
MARS1  -0.080 0.052 -0.015 0.054 -0.081 0.074 
MARS2  0.193 0.075  0.155 0.074  0.107 0.110 
MARS3  0.282 0.121  0.185 0.092  0.262 0.172 
KIDS_LT13  -0.101 0.047 -0.220 0.089 -0.329 0.093 
KIDS_GT13 0.178  0.066  -0.057 0.093 -0.116 0.113 
HIQ1  0.761 0.050  0.380 0.046  0.546 0.072 
HIQ2  0.410 0.041  0.156 0.040  0.198 0.054 
Bad health  -0.727  0.060  -0.134 0.075 -0.161 0.091 
HHSIZE  -0.219 0.016 -0.126 0.035 -0.155 0.034 
Work0  –  – 0.731  0.041 2.023  0.091 
Constant 0.625  0.097  -0.585 0.112 -0.624 0.161 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.208  0.135 0.465  0.199 
KIDS_LT13  –  – 0.137  0.125 0.254  0.151 
Bad  health  –  – -0.817 0.135 -1.564 0.208 
HHSIZE  –  –  0.033 0.038 -0.020 0.044 
CARE  –  – -0.130 0.169 -0.356 0.298 
        
σa  – –  1.113  0.044 
ρ  – –  0.553  0.020 
Log likelihood   -13325.059  -5715.577  -5300.593 
N 23,354  19,194  19,194 
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Finland 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.131 0.105 -0.180 0.113 -0.359 0.227 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.549  0.075 0.843  0.092 
MARS1  0.069 0.086  0.067 0.097 -0.006 0.139 
MARS2  -0.160 0.120 -0.127 0.124 -0.302 0.189 
MARS3  -0.085 0.235 -0.209 0.199 -0.467 0.350 
KIDS_LT13  -0.279 0.085 -0.090 0.192 -0.277 0.209 
KIDS_GT13 0.083  0.089  0.045 0.137 -0.087 0.196 
HIQ1  0.615 0.076  0.367 0.082  0.549 0.126 
HIQ2  0.276 0.073  0.175 0.078  0.213 0.115 
Bad health  -0.533  0.123  -0.237 0.161 -0.191 0.221 
HHSIZE  -0.115 0.031 -0.100 0.078 -0.256 0.081 
Work0  –  – 0.444  0.076 1.780  0.177 
Constant 0.821  0.168  -0.349 0.232 -0.662 0.370 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.074  0.240 0.303  0.371 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.093 0.227 -0.117 0.279 
Bad  health  –  – -0.372 0.291 -1.128 0.442 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.052  0.092 0.182  0.097 
CARE  –  – 0.115  0.208 0.161  0.415 
        
σa  – –  1.259  0.096 
ρ  – –  0.613  0.036 
Log likelihood   -3560.948  -1756.744  -1642.894 
N 8,522  6,465  6,470 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
Greece 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.028 0.099 -0.071 0.122 -0.160 0.194 
LFPt-1  –  – 2.194  0.057 1.288  0.072 
MARS1  -0.495 0.075 -0.283 0.090 -0.597 0.146 
MARS2  0.339 0.144  0.178 0.144  0.332 0.263 
MARS3  0.557 0.160  0.154 0.208  0.067 0.331 
KIDS_LT13  -0.179 0.062 -0.047 0.112 -0.220 0.141 
KIDS_GT13 0.018  0.065  -0.039 0.084 -0.152 0.126 
HIQ1  1.164 0.066  0.590 0.065  1.005 0.114 
HIQ2  0.426 0.056  0.180 0.052  0.394 0.093 
Bad health  -0.590  0.113  -0.319 0.206 -0.420 0.231 
HHSIZE  -0.057 0.022  0.019 0.052  0.003 0.061 
Work0  –  – 0.738  0.061 3.051  0.191 
Constant -0.652  0.130  -1.573 0.154 -2.246 0.259 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.225  0.162 0.465  0.302 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.058 0.154 -0.009 0.225 
Bad  health  –  – -0.206 0.278 -0.889 0.582 
HHSIZE  –  – -0.059 0.056 -0.094 0.077 
CARE  –  – 0.205  0.243 0.489  0.444 
        
σa  – –  1.478  0.085 
ρ  – –  0.686  0.025 
Log likelihood  -8186.0463  -2836.805  -2600.8975 
N 14,968  11,834  11,834 
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Ireland 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.431 0.118 -0.103 0.137 -0.204 0.185 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.474  0.050 0.978  0.060 
MARS1  -0.369 0.075 -0.142 0.082 -0.428 0.142 
MARS2  -0.144 0.131  0.031 0.135 -0.204 0.213 
MARS3  0.463 0.265  0.456 0.277  0.068 0.442 
KIDS_LT13  -0.392 0.062  0.003 0.093 -0.258 0.106 
KIDS_GT13 -0.057  0.067  0.033 0.075 -0.044 0.103 
HIQ1  1.326 0.075  0.844 0.078  1.303 0.133 
HIQ2  0.668 0.049  0.405 0.055  0.545 0.080 
Bad health  -0.811  0.121  -0.390 0.193 -0.551 0.227 
HHSIZE  -0.117 0.014 -0.175 0.031 -0.221 0.041 
Work0  –  – 0.686  0.062 2.400  0.128 
Constant 0.592  0.125  -0.794 0.141 -0.636 0.246 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.037  0.184 0.394  0.303 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.468 0.144 -0.502 0.205 
Bad  health  –  – -1.110 0.446 -2.853 0.652 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.132  0.037 0.120  0.054 
CARE  –  – -0.688 0.278 -1.501 0.459 
        
σa  – –  1.568  0.065 
ρ  – –  0.711  0.017 
Log likelihood  -7132.153  -3699.354  -3056.291 
N 13,210  10,402  10,402 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
Italy 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.305 0.069 -0.207 0.081 -0.226 0.129 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.314  0.035 0.897  0.047 
MARS1  -0.488 0.057 -0.337 0.064 -0.809 0.130 
MARS2  0.147 0.137  0.067 0.145 -0.130 0.208 
MARS3  0.574 0.164  0.460 0.152  0.528 0.362 
KIDS_LT13  -0.034 0.048  0.044 0.064 -0.143 0.082 
KIDS_GT13 0.075  0.050  0.144 0.054  0.103 0.090 
HIQ1  1.495 0.081  1.289 0.096  2.896 0.200 
HIQ2  0.817 0.041  0.640 0.045  1.288 0.082 
Bad health  -0.242  0.064  -0.291 0.081 -0.244 0.118 
HHSIZE  -0.118 0.017 -0.165 0.030 -0.098 0.037 
Work0  –  – 0.965  0.048 3.757  0.132 
Constant 0.602  0.134  -0.653 0.168 -1.046 0.263 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.003  0.158 0.548  0.309 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.114 0.106  0.135 0.183 
Bad  health  –  –  0.247 0.163 -0.191 0.267 
HHSIZE  –  –  0.110 0.036 -0.074 0.051 
CARE  –  – -0.109 0.194 -0.908 0.436 
        
σa  – –  2.248  0.055 
ρ  – –  0.835  0.007 
Log likelihood   -14703.799  -8035.899  -5226.8487 
N 26,856  23,009  23,009 
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Netherlands 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.374 0.108  0.001 0.133 -0.034 0.162 
LFPt-1  –  – 2.124  0.048 1.425  0.061 
MARS1  -0.545 0.076 -0.371 0.069 -0.603 0.106 
MARS2  -0.384 0.103 -0.140 0.090 -0.319 0.138 
MARS3  -0.028 0.288  0.100 0.240  0.005 0.464 
KIDS_LT13  -0.513 0.060 -0.484 0.097 -0.838 0.120 
KIDS_GT13 -0.122  0.063  -0.201 0.080 -0.332 0.104 
HIQ1  0.921 0.071  0.343 0.070  0.368 0.093 
HIQ2  0.323 0.052  0.121 0.053  0.126 0.071 
Bad health  -0.817  0.076  -0.411 0.113 -0.542 0.132 
HHSIZE  -0.246 0.023 -0.116 0.046 -0.204 0.053 
Work0  –  – 0.710  0.047 2.040  0.126 
Constant 1.266  0.117  -1.100 0.194 -1.010 0.234 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.421  0.139 0.723  0.218 
KIDS_LT13  –  – 0.185  0.135 0.414  0.188 
Bad  health  –  – -0.783 0.190 -1.325 0.281 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.102  0.051 0.161  0.065 
CARE  –  – -0.409 0.230 -0.585 0.336 
        
σa  – –  0.985  0.059 
ρ  – –  0.493  0.030 
Log likelihood   -10063.813  -3910.049  -3802.942 
N 17,490  14,369  14,369 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
Portugal 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.293 0.090 -0.251 0.088 -0.179 0.140 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.064  0.040 0.656  0.052 
MARS1  -0.263 0.076 -0.201 0.091 -0.454 0.132 
MARS2  0.164 0.115  0.168 0.134  0.014 0.201 
MARS3  0.681 0.138  0.385 0.146 -0.109 0.224 
KIDS_LT13  -0.081 0.056  0.047 0.064  0.030 0.086 
KIDS_GT13 -0.053  0.057  0.010 0.055 -0.018 0.089 
HIQ1  1.603 0.156  1.594 0.195  2.718 0.252 
HIQ2  0.613 0.084  0.505 0.092  0.672 0.150 
Bad health  -0.577  0.057  -0.306 0.066 -0.340 0.088 
HHSIZE  -0.115 0.017 -0.141 0.030 -0.077 0.034 
Work0  –  – 0.679  0.056 2.793  0.121 
Constant 0.999  0.130  -0.043 0.166  0.380 0.307 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.038  0.211 0.025  0.318 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.118 0.128  0.013 0.223 
Bad  health  –  – -0.541 0.142 -2.363 0.275 
HHSIZE  –  –  0.057 0.039 -0.197 0.073 
CARE  –  – -0.172 0.236  0.856 0.445 
        
σa  – –  2.126  0.067 
ρ  – –  0.819  0.009 
Log likelihood   -8576.428  -5712.376  -3842.8 
N 15,091  13,125  13,125 
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Spain 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.146 0.061 -0.077 0.067 -0.021 0.104 
LFPt-1  –  – 1.606  0.039 0.861  0.047 
MARS1  -0.668 0.057 -0.450 0.056 -0.789 0.093 
MARS2  0.060 0.095 -0.050 0.091 -0.170 0.155 
MARS3  0.793 0.145  0.380 0.153  0.122 0.282 
KIDS_LT13  -0.188 0.047  0.046 0.068 -0.264 0.084 
KIDS_GT13 -0.042  0.048  0.081 0.055 -0.028 0.077 
HIQ1  1.137 0.050  0.700 0.048  1.089 0.080 
HIQ2  0.496 0.046  0.289 0.043  0.469 0.067 
Bad health  -0.387  0.060  -0.155 0.077 -0.218 0.100 
HHSIZE  -0.098 0.014 -0.114 0.027 -0.104 0.033 
Work0  –  – 0.690  0.044 2.316  0.103 
Constant 0.066  0.104  -1.080 0.126 -1.072 0.198 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.145  0.135 0.551  0.240 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.091 0.105  0.373 0.151 
Bad  health  –  – -0.329 0.133 -0.824 0.234 
HHSIZE  –  –  0.069 0.031 -0.029 0.044 
CARE  –  – -0.043 0.150 -0.365 0.265 
        
σa  – –  1.391  0.050 
ρ  – –  0.659  0.016 
Log likelihood  -12074.621  -5963.402  -5293.533 
N 23,581  18,889  18,889 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. 
United Kingdom 
 Static  probit  Pooled probit  RE Probit 
  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE 
CARE  -0.176 0.053 -0.106 0.060 -0.141 0.083 
LFPt-1  –  – 2.029  0.044 1.399  0.054 
MARS1  0.064 0.066 -0.048 0.056 -0.062 0.086 
MARS2  -0.155 0.080  0.047 0.065  0.022 0.101 
MARS3  0.251 0.184  0.139 0.140  0.112 0.253 
KIDS_LT13  -0.776 0.052 -0.507 0.085 -0.809 0.101 
KIDS_GT13 -0.127  0.063  -0.196 0.073 -0.322 0.100 
HIQ1  0.428 0.047  0.133 0.037  0.221 0.056 
HIQ2  0.246 0.052  0.095 0.048  0.111 0.065 
Bad health  -0.753  0.053  -0.340 0.066 -0.424 0.074 
HHSIZE  -0.176 0.019 -0.018 0.031 -0.059 0.039 
Work0  –  – 0.544  0.044 1.532  0.096 
Constant 0.939  0.114  -0.860 0.124 -0.778 0.178 
          
Correlated  effects          
KIDS_GT13  –  – 0.530  0.153 0.879  0.226 
KIDS_LT13  –  – -0.029 0.119 -0.018 0.159 
Bad  health  –  – -0.597 0.116 -1.061 0.167 
HHSIZE  –  – 0.041  0.036 0.081  0.050 
CARE  –  – -0.010 0.094 -0.058 0.148 
        
σa  – –  0.904  0.050 
ρ  – –  0.450  0.027 
Log likelihood  -10156.799  -4438.490  -4320.942 
N 18,227  15,220  15,220 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the ECHP. REVISER – Research Training Network on 
Health, Ageing and Retirement 
 
 
 
REVISER was launched by several members of the ENEPRI network in August 2003. 
The project was financed under the programme on Improving the Human Research 
Potential & the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base of the 5
th EU Research Framework 
Programme.  
 
The REVISER project finances training stays for young researchers in the following six 
research institutes:  
 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,   
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
 
Trainees participate in research conducted in the areas of population ageing, health and 
retirement in the institutes in which they are placed, often in the context of common 
research projects developed by consortiums of ENEPRI partners. Trainees must be 
nationals of an EU member state or associated state, or must have resided in the EU for 
at least five years immediately prior to their appointment. This network aims at fostering 
the mobility of researchers. Thus, trainees must not be nationals of the state in which 
the institute appointing them is located and must not have carried out their normal 
activities in that state for more than 12 of the 24 months prior to the appointment.  
 
This project is coordinated by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS. For further information, contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
ISWE-SAS  Institute for Slovak and World Economy, Bratislava, Slovakia 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
 
ENEPRI Research Reports are designed to make the results of research projects undertaken within the 
ENEPRI framework publicly available. The findings and conclusions should be attributed to the author 
and not to the ENEPRI network as such. 
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